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Abstract
Kenya, along with countries like Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana, is leading the way on the continent in
innovating new applications and programs that enable developments in the information communication
technology (ICT) sector. This growth has not gone unnoticed. It has attracted substantial international
interest, not just from non-profit organizations focused on development, but increasingly from for-profit
actors interested in investing in the country.
In this environment, understanding how tech innovation happens in Kenya – the roles played by these
many different international, local, for-profit, and not-for-profit actors – is a big part of understanding the
shape of new technologies that will emerge. Yet many of the theories that exist to explain technology
innovation were developed to describe processes in Western contexts, like Silicon Valley, far removed
from the reality of innovation in Kenya.
This paper uses the technology innovation sector in Kenya to illustrate where existing innovation theories
fall short. If we hope to understand the growth of these sector and help shape its development, ICT,
communication, and management scholars need to work together to develop better theories to explain
the unique context of innovation in African countries.
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Introduction
Kenya’s mobile communication industry is a fast growing
innovative sector that increasingly produces technologies
with a global significance. Examples include M-PESA,
the mobile banking system that has made Kenya the
global leader in mobile money (The Economist, 2013).
Such achievements sit in stark contrast to perceptions, so
prevalent among many outside of the continent, that Africa
is ‘backwards’ or ‘underdeveloped’. Working against such
characterizations, the mobile communication industries in
Kenya and a handful of other African countries have rapidly
expanded in the last five years. This has attracted widespread
international interest, not just from those interested
in helping to ‘save Africa’, but increasingly from those
interested in investing in it as well. In Kenya—the country
that many have called the “tech hub of Africa” (Bloomberg,
2013) – these actors include development organizations as
well as multinational technology companies and private
equity firms. All these actors have the potential to influence
the kinds of technologies that are created in the Information
Communication Technology (ICT) sector.
The Kenyan government has also turned its attention
towards the ICT sector. In the last few years, the government
has launched, among other things, the Konza City project
and Huduma. The Konza City project is intended to be the
country’s new home for technology innovation and has been
branded as the “Silicon Savannah.” Huduma is a new system
for streamlining public-to-government communication
and government service delivery, which includes a mobile
platform and is slated to include an online platform before
the end of 2014. Though the success of such projects is
debatable, these projects, along with the new ICT Master
Plan, help illustrate the importance that the government
places on the growth of the ICT sector for the future of
Kenya’s economic growth and global position.1
In this environment, understanding the process by which
innovations in the ICT sector are taking place is of central
importance for the future development and sustainability
of this sector. Yet many of the theories that exist to explain
innovation were developed to describe processes in
1

The ICT Master Plan forms a central part of the current administration’s
new vision for the future.
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Western contexts. While in recent years, more theories
have been developed to describe information technology
innovation in an increasingly globalized context, too many
focus on these complicated global dynamics predominantly
in relation to how they affect the innovation potential in
Western multinational companies.
After providing a review of the existing international
literature on technological innovation, which is largely
situated in the business and management literature, I will
examine the case of the Kenyan ICT innovation ecosystem to
demonstrate where the existing theories may be insufficient.
Through fieldwork conducted over two summers in the
Kenyan technology innovation sector, I will outline some
of the different players in the Kenyan ecosystem and many
of the numerous and overlapping networks that allow
it to function. This outline will be used to make the case
that while the existing theories on innovation may be
helpful, they should always be approached and used with
a critical eye. In particular, I will argue they undervalue the
contribution of the social, cultural, and historical contexts in
which innovation takes place. In addition, existing theories
overlook the ways in which those contexts intermingle
and conflict in a transnational innovation ecosystem. In
the Kenyan case, the particularities of the context have led
to an innovation system whose structure differs from the
ones described by existing theories, particularly in the role
of universities and the incubators. It has also meant that
the purpose of the sector – who technology in Nairobi is
being created for – is constantly being renegotiated by the
different individual and organizational actors currently
engaged in the system, whether they are multinational or
local, non-profit or for-profit.
It is my hope that this illustration might be a helpful
word of caution for practitioners, policymakers, and
innovators eager to fully adopt Western approaches to
technology innovation in a transnational ecosystem where
the motivations such as “social impact” and “economic
growth” are constantly being renegotiated. Similarly, I
suggest that this challenge to existing theories of innovation
contextualized in such a hybrid and fluctuating innovation
ecosystem may be useful for communication scholars
interested in how such culturally divergent actors engage
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with one another around a common interest: the growth of
local mobile innovation in Kenya.
This article predominantly draws on two sources. First,
it uses fieldwork conducted during two one-month
long residential fellowships at iHub Research, a Kenyan
research center affiliated with the iHub incubator, during
the summers of 2013 and 2014. This fieldwork includes
nineteen semi-structured interviews with individuals
from a sample of Kenyan incubators and start-ups, the
government, the media, and the multinational technology
companies engaged in the sector. Secondly, it incorporates
the analysis of publicly available documents, including
official government reports, private sector reports, and
journalistic coverage of the sector. Before proceeding, a
few definitions are necessary to ensure a common frame of
analysis, particularly regarding ICT innovation and the ICT
innovation ecosystem.
“Innovation” is an illusive concept with many different
interpretations in different industrial and scholarly
communities. For the purposes of this paper, I will begin
with the way in which management scholars conceptualize
“ICT innovation.” Rogers defines innovation as “the process
of introducing new ideas to the firm which result in increased
firm performance” (Rogers, 1998). Baregheh, Rowley,
and Sambrook’s definition of innovation as “the multistage process whereby organizations transform ideas into
new/improved products, service or processes, in order to
advance, compete and differentiate themselves successfully
in their marketplace” (Baregheh, Rowley, & Sambrook,
2009, p. 1334), represents an attempt to encapsulate Rogers’
definition and the many other different ways innovation is
conceptualized within the management discipline. However,
for the purpose of understanding ICT innovation in Kenya,
we need to stretch beyond management scholarship and
incorporate the definitions of innovation used by scholars
in the ICT for development (ICT4D) field. The ICT4D field

has long been engaged with the Kenyan context. This field
has advanced the concept of “participatory development,”
but has only recently been exploring innovation. They see
ICT innovation more as a socially-embedded process or
what Avgerou calls “innovation in situ” (Avgerou, 2010,
p. 4). In other words, how might technological innovation
be reflective of “what is locally meaningful, desirable, or
controversial, and therefore, on how technology innovation
and organizational change emerge (or are delayed) amid
the local social dynamics” (Avgerou, 2010, p. 4)? I therefore
offer the following composite of the two definitions:
ICT innovation comprises of the actions or processes of
inventing a new method, idea, or product for the ICT
sector that derives from the social, political, and cultural
background of the individuals, the organizations, and the
physical context in which the innovation takes place.
The “ICT innovation ecosystem” builds on this understanding
of innovation and draws from arguments made by Fransman
and others who conceptualize the many players and their
interactions involved in ICT use as an “ecosystem.” This
becomes a useful metaphor to illustrate that it is “more than
just a technological system” but instead a “social system
within which ICTs are embedded” (Smith & Elder, 2010).
These scholars also acknowledge the importance of the
innovation process in ensuring that theICT sector is
relevant for society’s broader social development. I would
therefore propose that with the multitude of actors involved
in innovating new technologies– telecom companies, startups, incubators, the government, banks, multinational
technology companies, international NGOs, and others
– an “ecosystem” is an equally useful metaphor through
which to understand technology production as well as
use. Keeping this metaphor in mind will help to visualize
the ways in which the meaning and the purpose of the
ICT sector in Kenya are constantly renegotiated by the
interactions between very different actors.
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Existing Theories of Innovation
Much of the existing literature on innovation stems from
the work of the famous economist Joseph Schumpeter, who
pioneered the now widely held view that innovation and
entrepreneurship are key to ensuring continued economic
growth. In the Kenyan context, a number of scholars have
similarly argued for the central role of innovation, and
particularly entrepreneurship, in supporting national
growth (Ndemo & Maina, 2007; Tiffen & Mortimore,
1994; Africa Research Bulletin, 2007). There is a wide
and continuously developing array of literature within
business and economic journals on the role of innovation
in economic growth (Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2005; Carlsson,
2007), with an increasing emphasis on the role of
innovation in a globalized system (Thoenig & Verdier, 2003;
Freund & Weinhold, 2004). This reflects the increasing
transnationalism of the innovation process. This literature
tends to focus on either multinational companies and
their innovation processes in countries outside their home
countries (Nachum, Zaheer, & Gross, 2008; Freeman, 1995;
Evangelista & Mastrostefano, 2006) or the role of larger
local companies’ innovation in the economic growth of
emerging economies (Gorodnichenko, Sveynar, & Terrell,
2010; Morgan, 2007). In short, as Fichman has pointed out,
the goal of much of the existing research on innovation in
this area is “to provide guidance to [company] managers on
questions of ‘whether, when, and how to innovate with IT’”
(Fichman, 2004, p. 315 citing Swanson and Ramilier, 2004).
While the focus is often still on business-led innovation,
other theories in this field have argued for thinking beyond
innovation internal to a business. For example, the concept of
a “national innovation system” (NIS), the system of various
actors involved in innovation in a national economy2,
argues that innovation cannot happen entirely internally
and that partnerships are often necessary to spur innovation
on a national scale (Lee & Park, 2006; Dodgson, Mathews,
Kastelle, & Hu, 2008). Nonetheless, such partnerships are
still often described in terms of “collaborative advantage”
(Huxham, 1996) or “synergy” (Mackintosh, 1992), both of
which tend to focus on company mergers or formal supply
chain partnerships that give companies an advantage over
competitors (Cao & Zhang, 2008).
2

For further discussion see for example Freeman, 2002; Balzat &
Hanusch, 2004; or Fagerberg & Srholec, 2008
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More progressively, Etzkowitz and others have
conceptualized this ‘national innovation system’ as
necessarily involving other actors, particularly the
government and advanced research centers at universities
(Lundvall, 2007; Mowery & Oxley, 1995; Adner & Kapoor,
2010; Bala & Davenport, 2008). Etzkowitz famously
described this as a “triple helix” linking industry,
government, and universities with an interactive exchange
of research, funding, and production (2002), often involving
business incubators that emerge from these partnerships
and function as a key nexus between them.
In recent years, the university has featured more prominently
in theories about innovation because of its role as a rich
source of research and development (R&D) as a function of
the flow of human capital in its student body (Mian S., 2011;
Siegwart & Hess, 2013; Al-Mubaraki & Busler, 2011). The
model of a university linked with an incubator to facilitate
R&D for productive innovation has proliferated beyond
the United States in places like Israel (Rothschild and
Darr 2005), Mexico (Molina, Aguirre, Breceda, & Cabero,
2011), Portugal (Ratinho & Henriques, 2010), and Rwanda
(Aggerwal, 2012).
Concurrent with the development of innovation theories
involving universities, the “open innovation model” has
become particularly popular for understanding innovation
in the high-tech industries, of which ICT is certainly
included (Gassman, Enkel, & Chesbrough, 2010). Among
these scholars, open innovation is conceptualized as “the use
of purposive inflows and outflux of knowledge to accelerate
internal innovation, and expand the markets for external
use of innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough, West, &
Vanhaverbeke, 2006). While this definition again focuses
on markets and companies, it also acknowledges the value
of information exchange between companies and other
actors. Gassman, Enkel, and Chesbrough describe nine
different perspectives through which “open innovation” has
been conceptualized by researchers in this field, including
the spatial perspective (the geographic globalization of
innovation), the user perspective (the integration of users
into the innovation process), and the tool perspective (the
integration of ‘open’ platforms to facilitate participation
by a wider array of innovators) (Gassman, Enkel, &
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Chesbrough, 2010, pp. 1-2). Ultimately, this line of theory –
most typically attributed to Henry Chesbrough – is arguing
that companies can no longer afford to innovate on their
own, and that the boundaries between a company and its
surrounding environment are, necessarily, more permeable
than before. This has led, for example, to large companies
recognizing the value of innovations at start-ups that they
eventually acquire and integrate into their own operation.
Such is the case of Google’s 2013 acquisition of the Israeli
traffic mapping start-up, Waze, or even by the models of
incubation at fast-paced accelerator programs that measure
a start-up’s success by how much a large company is willing
to pay to acquire it.
What Etzkowtiz’s triple helix and the open innovation model
have in common is their belief in the importance of the
exchange of knowledge and information between various
actors involved in the process of technology innovation.
Another way in which scholars in the management field
have articulated this has been through the importance
of “networks” (Murray, 2002; Valverde, Sole, Bedau,
& Packard, 2007). Saxenian, for example, has shown
the importance of building networks for the success of
innovation in Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1996). Others have
examined it in other contexts like the high-tech industry in
Germany (Gemunden, Ritter, & Heydebrech, 1996)
The “network” as a metaphor has been so widely applied
in the social sciences – from trade networks to computer
networks to knowledge networks to the ubiquitous social
networks – that a bit of specificity is necessary before
proceeding. At its broadest, a network is an interconnected
group of people or things. For business and management
scholars, networks are largely conceptualized as formal
and informal linkages, predominantly between firms,
but also among other actors, like universities (Powell &
Grodal, 2005; DeBresson & Amesse, 1991). Such networks
are seen as an important part of the innovation process.
Ritter and Germunden, for example, have argued that
companies need to “develop network competence in order
to link their organization to other players in the market
to allow interactions beyond organizational boundaries”
(2004, p. 548). This literature argues that fostering network
ties, particularly ties between diverse players (Nieto &
Santamaria, 2007), can expand a company’s knowledge
base (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002) and, in turn, enhance
knowledge diffusion and technology development (Powell
W. W., 1998). Often this is studied as more partnerships

across different levels of a supply chain (Soosay, Hyland,
& Ferrer, 2008; Kim, Cavusgil, & Calatone, 2006; Lee &
Whang, 2000) and is typically seen as motivated by an issue
of resource dependence when a company has insufficient
internal capacity to effectively innovate on its own (Wang,
2008; Teo, Wei, & Benbasat, 2003; Brass, Galaskiewicz,
Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Hseih, Yeh, & Chen, 2010).
However, some of this literature also emphasizes the
importance of informal networks between various firms, or
what is often described as an “innovation milieu” (Keeble
& Wilkinson, 1999; Camagni, 1995). This perspective
stresses the importance of “soft factors” like “common
understanding and behavioral attitude for starting and
maintaining innovation processes” (Todtling & Lehner,
2009, p. 5). Many theories have subsequently developed
around what kinds of factors encourage the growth of
strong informal networks. The notion of ‘proximity’ proves
particularly popular. This certainly includes geographic
proximity (Lagendijk & Oinas; Furman, Porter, & Stern,
2002), which scholars argue can encourage network
growth among firms through access to resources, local
markets, and a similar business culture among other things.
However, Boschma and others have argued that geographic
proximity is insufficient on its own and is primarily useful
in its ability to “facilitate interactive learning, most likely
by strengthening the other dimensions of proximity”
(Boschma, 2005, p. 62), including social, institutional,
and cognitive proximities (Harrison, 1994; Howells, 2002;
Letaifa & Rabeau, 2013; Boschma, 2005). The concepts of
social proximity, what Letaifa and Rabeau describe as “the
individuals’ levels of relationships and includes trust based
on friendship, kinship and experience” (2013, p. 2072), and
cognitive proximity, what they describe as “the similarities
in the ways actors perceive, interpret and evaluate the
world” (ibid), are helpful here. They move us away from the
conception of a network as largely links between inanimate
firms or nodes and push us to think of the many individuals
involved in those networks as well as the many networks
that might develop between the numerous different
categories of actors.
The literature in the business and management field
illustrates an emphasis on the role of the company in
innovation processes, increasingly examining how
innovation is changing in a globalized context, and how
networks and partnerships can be leveraged for more
effective innovation. A few scholars in this field have
Page 7
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acknowledged the important role played by actors beyond
these companies, most frequently emphasizing the role of
universities for research and development and, at times, the
role of government in providing financial and regulatory
support. Finally, the research exploring open innovation
and networks, both formal and informal, have further

demonstrated the importance of ‘nontraditional’ actors,
such as end-users, in innovation. With this in mind, the
next section will explore the Kenyan case in more depth to
assess the extent to which these existing theories are relevant
in the Kenyan context and to examine ways in which they
might need to be discarded, challenged, or adapted.

Case Study and an Evolving Theory
“God has been great to Africa by giving us so many problems, because problems breed innovation.” – Dr. Bitange
Ndemo, former Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Information and Communication in Kenya, June 2014
While provocative, such a statement does seem to have
some grounding in the context of Kenyan technology
development. The two innovations that the country’s tech
industry is currently best known for, Ushahidi and M-PESA,
both in some way can attribute their success to problems
that Kenyans face. Ushahidi, the platform initially designed
to map the election in 2007, made a name for itself in part
because it became a vital tool for mapping, tracking, and
responding to instances of violence when the post-election
climate deteriorated. M-PESA, while not entirely Kenyan in
origin as a central role was played by the British company
Vodafone Group, took off so successfully in Kenya because
its mobile banking platform appealed to many in the
poorest communities who could not access the traditional
banking system. A current Senior Fellow for Global
Economy and Development at Brookings recently wrote
that Kenya is “a leader in the information communication
revolution in the region” and that “the overall performance
of the [East African] region will to a great extent depend
on what happens in Kenya” (Kimenyi, 2014). Interviewees
from some of the multinationals present in Kenya have
attributed the country’s current appeal as a tech investment
opportunity to the growing middle class, the growing urban
population, and an economy that is not natural resource
dependent as many of its competitors such as Nigeria and
Ghana are often seen. With such attention and at such a
crucial moment in Kenya’s economic development, it is a
particularly pivotal moment for a more detailed look at the
context around technology innovation in Kenya in order to
develop theories that are more reflective of the current state
of this ecosystem and its underlying norms.
Page 8

Transnationalism

As the case of M-PESA might indicate, many technological
innovations in Kenya are not entirely domestic in origin.
For example, Microsoft and Google both provide training
and access to their mobile smartphone platforms for
Kenyan developers to design apps. International donors,
such as Omidyar Network and the World Bank’s InfoDev
program, have played a large part in helping to finance the
country’s new technology sector, like the highly trafficked
tech hub, iHub.
The colonial history of most of the countries in Africa
has meant a long history of foreign participation in
economic affairs. Microsoft and IMB’s recent decision
to make Kenya their regional hub is in keeping with the
country’s geopolitical history as the regional hub for many
contemporary international actors, like the United Nations
and the US government. With numerous foreigners
traveling to Kenya to establish their own start-ups (e.g.
Map Kibera Project or Hummingbill), or coming to the
country as venture capitalists (e.g. 1% Club) to fund others,
the ‘national innovation system’ in Kenya is anything but
exclusively national in structure. Multinational companies
such as IBM, Google, Procter & Gamble, Nokia, Huawei,
Intel, and Microsoft, for example, have all set up major, if
not their principal, regional offices in Kenya.
Such a transnational innovation ecosystem may not seem to
distinguish Kenya from the American ecosystem that many
of the existing theories describe as increasingly globalized
(Ernst, 2002; Florida, 1997; Archibugi & Iammarino, 2002).
However, the nature of the transnationalism and the power
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dynamics between the international and local actors in
both varies significantly. At the risk of oversimplifying, the
distinction between the two in large part comes down to
the apparent groundedness of the largest companies in the
respective ecosystems. What is meant by ‘largest’ here is the
most economically powerful actors, or as Bourdieu might
describe, those actors with the most “economic capital”
(Bourdieu, 1986). In the United States the ‘largest’ such
actors typically have their headquarters inside the country,
pay taxes to the government there, and focus on American
consumers as their initial user market. Even if their intention
is to create more globally relevant products, the American
context is the home ecosystem, and the home culture, from
which many of these companies such as Apple, IBM and
Intel emerged. Similarly, many of the venture capitalists and
angel investors who help fund US start-ups in their initial
stages and accelerator programs that aid their progress
into sustainable companies are often US-based (Kaplan &
Stromberg, 2004).
By contrast, many of the actors with the most economic
capital in the Kenyan context have been largely foreign.
These include the multinational technology companies
(e.g. Google, Microsoft, and Hewlett Packard) that have
helped to finance much of the innovation taking place in
Kenya, as well as venture capital firms (e.g. Africa Media
Venture Fund, Anonoa Sustainable Impact Fund, and CMA
Investment Holdings), and international donor agencies
(e.g. the World Bank, USAID, and the Ford Foundation)
that see a market for innovations for social good in the
Kenyan ecosystem. While these actors are undoubtedly
global and not exclusively Kenyan in their focus, some of
these actors have been involved in Kenya for quite some
time. Interviewees at such companies describe the current
Kenyan administration as economically competent, and
few, if any, withdrew from the country following the recent
increase in terrorist attacks along the coast or after the
2013 Westgate mall attack. Interviewees speculated that
such events had scared away prospective, but not current
investors in the ICT industry.
While the balance between local and international actors
in the Kenyan case does not exactly resemble that of the
United States, business and management scholars might
argue that the particularly transnational nature of the
ecosystem would be supportive of progressive innovation
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990; Saxenian, 1996; Ernst, 2006).
Nonetheless, even with multinationals or foreign donors

that have been in Kenya for a while, there are likely varying
levels of long-term investment in the local ecosystem.
This is rarely at issue when dealing with a more ‘national’
or at least more ‘nationally-based’ network of actors.
For example, a number of the managers of Kenyan tech
incubators reported that they were increasingly looking for
local sources of financial support—from local banks such
as Equity Bank or from local telecoms like Safaricom—
as the “long-term commitment” of the multinationals to
growing the local innovation ecosystem is in doubt. As one
manager stated:
…we were very deliberate about local sponsorship
this year, from Chase Bank [a local Kenyan bank
not to be confused with the American company,
JP Morgan Chase] for example. When you have
someone that’s making their money locally and not
reliant on the ups and downs of the international
market, they are more likely to have priorities more
aligned with what’s happening on the ground.
Such local actors have clearly begun questioning the
commitment and investment of large international actors
in the local ecosystem. Yet the link between the locality of a
company’s headquarters and the depth of their investment
in Kenya is not so clear-cut. Would the financial dominance
of this market by international actors necessarily mean
that technology created in Kenya is less attentive to the
needs of the wider Kenyan tech ecosystem, or to the “many
problems” that Dr. Ndemo argued Africa has been blessed
with? Would a transition to local funders necessarily mean
that technological developments are more attentive to such
problems? Even if the answers are not so straightforward,
existing theories of innovation rarely problematize for
whom the particular technologies are being developed
beyond advocating for ‘user’ research.
Robert Fichman argues this may be a result of the widely
held view discussed earlier that innovation is an intrinsic
part of continued economic growth and therefore,
beneficial in its own right. It could be argued, particularly
in an ecosystem with so many foreign actors with large
amounts of economic capital, that it may be dangerous to
assume that the impact—especially the social and cultural
impact, but even the economic impact—of new technology
adoption is necessarily a good in and of itself. As the next
section will show, the emphasis on a positive “social impact”
of technological developments among a diverse array of
Page 9
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actors in the Kenyan ICT innovation ecosystem is another
factor that sets the Kenyan case apart from the ones existing
theories usually describe.

The Social Impact Factor

As mentioned earlier, both of Kenya’s most well-known
tech innovations, M-PESA and Ushahidi, can in some way
attribute their success to the problems faced by Kenyans. Yet,
most innovations across the globe could also, in some way,
be described as problem solving. At a very basic level, the
mobile phone and the laptop computer were both inventions
that solved the problem of physical restraint posed by their
predecessors. Improvements in computer processors have
made computers ever faster and more efficient enabling us
to do ever more things on them. While people in countries
such as the United States are certainly using technological
advances to solve serious social problems such as road
safety, or Hurricane Sandy communication logistics, it
would be difficult to argue that these social problems are the
primary drivers of the American tech industry. By contrast,
in Kenya, innovation “for the social good” is a conception
that permeates the ecosystem even as some entrepreneurs
desperately try to avoid it. I would argue that this is largely a
result of the particular historical context in the country, the
legacy of the dominant aid discourse that permeates much
ITC for development work in Africa, as well as the more
recent ways in which multinational tech companies view
their purpose in the country.
Even if many of these multinationals have had a presence in
Kenya for a long time, international development workers
and donor organizations, whose missions are focused
around solving such social problems, have been there
significantly longer. Whether through the United Nations,
the World Bank, or other humanitarian and development
not-for-profit organizations such as Internews or Medecins
Sans Frontieres, these organizations have represented a
significant economic and discursive presence in the Kenyan
capital for quite some time. Setting up its office in Kenya
in 1992, Medecins Sans Frontieres is in fact a relative
newcomer compared to organizations such as Oxfam that
have been in the country since soon after its independence
in 1963. In recent years, many of these organizations, that
have social impact at the top of their agendas, have begun
integrating new technologies into their development work.
The language of social impact motivation has in large part
guided the growth of the field of ICT for development.
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More recently (largely since 2008), some organizations
have begun investing in technologies that are being
generated locally with the hope that they will be better able
to solve real “social problems” than technology brought
from abroad (Lewis 2014). Such social problems include
access to education for children or access to information
for farmers. The new focus international NGOs have
on locally-generated technology reflects the popularity
of “participatory development” approaches in general
within the field of ICT and development. Participatory
development advocates argue that “local participation” is a
key component of ensuring that a new development project
is adopted more sustainably and is more reflective of local
needs (Nelson & Wright, 1995; Hickey & Mohan, 2004). The
ICT innovation ecosystem in Kenya represents a confluence
of local participation and the potential for “social impact”
making it particularly appealing to international NGOs.
Behaving like what Etzkowitz might call “public venture
capitalists” – a word he uses to describe government
support of entrepreneurs, rather than non-profits – these
organizations have partnered with incubators to support
access to resources for local entrepreneurs (Omidyar
Network), have provided technological expertise to Kenyan
journalists to improve their coverage of social issues
particularly in the health sector (Internews), and have
provided support for Kenyan entrepreneurs developing
sustainable climate technologies (InfoDev). Even if they do
not represent the largest financial support for the Kenyan tech
innovation sector, the current pervasiveness of interest in
technological innovation among development practitioners
makes it difficult for the technological innovation sector
to disassociate itself from such development objectives. As
a result, “social impact” has become, at least discursively,
a central motivation of many in the ICT innovation
ecosystem in Kenya, an ecosystem that were it situated in a
country without Kenya’s long history of international NGO
engagement might be a much more for-profit dominated
arena.
For example, tech incubators frame their objectives
within the “social impact” discourse, even though their
business models prioritize building profitable sustainable
businesses over developing technologies expressly to solve
social problems. Some interviewees, for example, have
echoed Schumpeter in arguing that support for economic
development through support for start-ups is itself a ‘social
good’ because it is a catalyst for economic growth. One
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incubator manager, agreeing that economic growth and
financial sustainability for their start-ups was a worthwhile
goal, explained that they avoid supporting more expressly
‘social enterprises’ because they are “easily dismissed as
things around NGOs which are largely ineffective.”
This kind of perspective has in turn penetrated many of the
NGOs, some of whom now describe their objectives in the
tech sector as not simply supporting innovations for direct
social impact, but as supporting financially sustainable
innovations as well. InfoDev, for example, explains one of
their motivations for engaging in tech innovation as follows:
“Entrepreneurs in the developing world often struggle to
get the know-how, the know-who, and the funding to take
their ideas to market, to establish viable companies and
create sustainable jobs” (infoDev, 2013). While few would
dispute that economic growth would be good for Kenya,
some – often those focused on what they call the “bottom
of the pyramid” – point out that overall national economic
growth is less useful than ensuring that some of the growth
is able to help the poorest communities and does not simply
lead to increased economic inequality (ESW, Enterprise
for a Sustainable World, 2013). This interplay between the
desire for economic growth and the desire for growth with a
social impact is, I would argue, one of the defining features
of the current ICT innovation ecosystem in Kenya.
The relative merit of allowing or relying on donor funding
with a social impact focus has also been debated among
Kenyan tech entrepreneurs for as long as the sector has
been around. One prominent figure in the sector made
the case in an interview that the long history of foreign
development aid distribution in Kenyan and the attention
that community is currently giving to the Kenyan tech
entrepreneurs runs the risk of making these innovators
dependent on this kind of funding, making it harder to
build financially sustainable companies. Another argued
that this kind of funding is essential for helping innovative
ideas initially get off the ground. This article certainly does
not attempt to resolve this debate. Instead, I propose that the
existence and prominence of such a debate is emblematic
of the complex and overlapping ways in which the various
actors in this ecosystem conceptualize the system’s ultimate
purpose. The predominance of the conflict between social
impact motivations and profit motivations represents a
significant divergence from the environments in which
most of the business innovation theory we examined earlier
was developed.

This ecosystem is further complicated by the fact that this
conflict between social impact and for-profit motivations
appears to extend to the actors that might be viewed as the
most economic growth focused: the multinationals. Many of
these companies admit to being in Kenya for market gains,
but they also emphasize social goals. Those involved in
mobile technology are certainly in Kenya with the intention
of capturing the growing African mobile phone market (a
fact of which Kenyan mobile entrepreneurs are largely well
aware). In keeping with Kenya’s historical position as a kind
of site of R&D for international actors (Tignor, 1998), one
interviewee from a multinational explained their belief that
if they could figure out how to engage in the mobile market
in Kenya, then they would know better how to engage in
other African countries. Kenya, for them, was the first
major site of entry into the African markets.
But many of the technology multinationals also portray
themselves as fundamentally interested in helping to
“encourage and strengthen an innovative culture” in
Kenya. IBM, for example, expressly describes its mission in
the country as focused on helping to solve Kenyan social
problems like sanitation, transportation, and education.
The international trend of civil society pressure on private
companies to do more for the communities that they
benefit from, known as corporate social responsibility
(Holme & Watts, 19999; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010; Portney,
2005), helps to partially explain this trend. Microsoft’s
4Africa initiative, for example, which it describes as a “new
effort through which the company will actively engage
in Africa’s economic development to improve its global
competitiveness” (Microsoft, 2014), is clear corporate
social responsibility. Google has an entire “social impact
team” working at its office in Nairobi. Many also talk about
supporting the growth of local knowledge production or
improving local skills and training as well as engaging in
projects, such as Microsoft’s role in the government’s “white
spaces project” to distribute internet access to rural schools
(Microsoft Research, 2014).
While some of this rhetoric could certainly be interpreted
as consistent with the view of economic growth as a social
good unto itself, it also demonstrates how such large
economic actors might have a difficult time justifying their
participation in the ecosystem without referring in some
way to “social impact.” Some of the academic business
literature has begun to theorize about “social innovation”
(Mulgan, Tucker, Ali, & Sanders, 2007; Mulgan, 2006;
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Gardner, Acharya, & Yach, 2007). Too few of the existing
models, however, are equipped to explain a context
where “social impact” frequently overlaps with profit and
economic growth as a central driving factor of a national
innovation system.

Local Actors

The engagement of such large international organizations
and companies certainly is one element that sets Kenya
apart from the nation innovation systems in many Western
countries. The roles played by the various domestic actors
similarly illustrate a context that diverges from what many
of the existing theories describe. Erkowitz’s triple helix
model of innovation, emphasizing the importance of
government and universities as well as industry, is a step
in the right direction, but by examining the different roles
played by the incubators, the universities, and government,
I will demonstrate how this model needs to be expanded if
it is to be useful for understanding this context.

Incubators & Universities

It is impossible to talk about the current ICT innovation
ecosystem in Kenya without talking about the role that has
been played by the incubators. Actors in the ecosystem
largely agree that even if the success of the incubators in
building new companies varies, they have certainly been
at the center of the changes in the ecosystem in the last
five years. As told by members of the current iHub team,
in 2010, after Ushahidi and M-PESA both made names
for themselves, what is believed to be the first technology
business incubator in Africa, iHub, opened its doors
on Ngong Road in Nairobi. The genesis of iHub was in
conversations among Kenyan “techies,” including members
of the Ushahidi team, eager for a physical space for their
growing community of programmers and developers, who
felt disjointed in the existing ecosystem.
A technology business incubator is typically understood,
even internationally, by the definition used by the USbased National Business Incubation Association (NBIA):
“a business support process that accelerates the successful
development of start-up and fledgling companies by
providing entrepreneurs with an array of targeted resources
and services” (NBIA, 2012). Many of the most successful
incubators in the US like Y-Combinator or DreamIt
Ventures, responsible for supporting the growth of
companies as well known as Reddit, AirBnB, and Dropbox,
operate on a for-profit basis. They run accelerator programs
to help turn ideas into profitable companies or companies
that can be acquired by much larger firms.
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By the NBIA’s definition, iHub is an incubator, but in
comparison to many incubators in practice, iHub might
better be described as a “pre-incubator” (Mian, Sarfraz;,
2014) because it operates as a not-for-profit and does not
provide any formal accelerator program or direct funding
for start-ups that use its space. Particularly in its early
years, it attracted young computer science students and
aspiring entrepreneurs as well as prospective funders and
representatives from some of the multinationals who would
cross paths in the halls or at the many organized networking
or training events. In part because of its perceived strength
facilitating these kinds of casual encounters (or as
innovation scholars might say, its strength at increasing the
geographic proximity between the different actors), it has
at times been described as “the unofficial headquarters of
Kenya’s tech movement” (Munford, 2013).
This ‘hub’ model now represents something of a trend across
Africa (Moraa & Gatheye, 2013; Kelly, 2014). While there
are more formal incubators emerging across the continent
such as Growth Hub or Nairobi Start-up Garage, which offer
intense, well-funded accelerator programs, many countries
across the continent have seen the opening of at least one
office using the iHub model of pre-incubation, or what has
also been described as simply co-working spaces (Morara,
2014). More formal incubators also opened in Kenya soon
after iHub, including the iHub offshoot, m:lab East Africa,
and iHub’s neighbor, Nailab.
Scholars of innovation have increasingly been discussing
the particular role these incubators might play in spurring
entrepreneurial tech innovations in a market economy
(Aernoudt, 2004; Colombo & Delmastro, 2002). Returning
to Etzkowitz, his argument that incubators, as well as
science parks and even venture capital firms, are “hybrid
organizations that embody elements of the triple helix
[Universities, Government, Industry] in their DNA”
(Etzkowitz, 2010, p. 1), fits well into this body of theory.
While the success of incubators like Y-Combinator in the
US or ATP Innovations in Australia, are acknowledged,
the true strength of the incubator is typically understood
as a linkage between industry and universities, between
knowledge production and building businesses around
them, and as Etzkowitz argues, government as well. In
fact, this link to sources of knowledge production seems
to be one of the key elements scholars have identified
about successful incubators. They are “often sited within a
technology park and affiliated to a technical university or
research institute” (Lalkaka, 2002, p. 167). Even if they are
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not situated in universities, incubators usually have strong
linkages of some sort with them (Archer, Garrison, &
Anderson, 2013; Mian S. A., 2011).
In Kenya, some incubators are indeed based at universities,
the most successful of which is @iLab at Strathmore
University. However, in this particular ecosystem, formal
partnerships with universities have been the exception
rather than the rule. Rather, the origin of most of the
Kenyan incubators, including Start-up Garage (formerly
88mph), was in industry, typically as mentioned before,
with funding from multinationals or donor agencies. This
is not to say that meaningful and productive linkages with
universities are not possible in Kenya. Rather, the crux of
the difference between the Kenyan case and many others is
that the knowledge production propelling new technology
development in Kenya is taking place within industry, or
within the incubators themselves, and not predominantly
at universities.
This is not to say that there is no crossover between
universities and industry. Many of the developers and
designers that have propelled Kenya’s ICT innovation
ecosystem over the past few years are recent graduates of
Kenyan universities,. Many come to join the incubators
while they are still students, while others have been hired
by the research centers at the big multinationals like Intel
and IBM. When I interviewed start-up founders who fell in
this category, many explained that their universities could
network them into jobs in the more formal sector of the tech
industry, but offered no guidance and few resources if they
were interested in starting their own company. Because of
the international attention the tech entrepreneurial sector
was getting, many graduates wanted to be a part of it rather
than find more traditional jobs, something one incubator
interviewee described as being attracted to the “mindshare”
quality of the incubators.
Some of the universities have recognized this and have
slowly begun to create networks with the tech community.
@iLab at Strathmore provides an interesting counter
example to the other Kenyan incubators. Emmanuel
Kweyu, the operations director at @iLab, explained that
their location at a university is a strength because it has
enabled them to build a reputation as a “research center and
non-profit so they know we’re not interested in profit.” In
addition to running an accelerator program like the other
incubators, @iLab also offers a Masters program in mobile
technology and innovation with financial support from

Safaricom, providing another link between industry and
the university. Kweyu believes that one of the weaknesses
of other incubators is their isolation from universities,
something @iLab is hoping their model will fix.
However, one of the primary limitations to engaging
universities with industry and vice versa may be the
disjointedness of knowledge production at the universities
in Kenya. As one prominent member of the ecosystem
stated, “most university departments are siloed so that there
is very little crossover between programming, computer
science or even agriculture programs and the business
schools,” something he believes would help universities
play a more central role in technology innovation. At the
same time, knowledge production, particularly in the form
of R&D, is happening at multinationals, like IBM Research,
and at the incubators, like iHub Research.
As a result, I propose adapting Etzkowitz’s triple helix model,
rather than discarding it entirely for the Kenyan context.
While universities can serve an important role, the key
element of that role is as knowledge producers. In the Kenyan
context, knowledge production is currently more disbursed.
We can instead expand Etzkowitz’s model by replacing the
university node, with a “knowledge production” node,
acknowledging the diverse ways in which, and locations
where, knowledge around technology is currently being
produced in Kenya. In response, Etzkowitz might argue
“the competitive advantage of the university, over other
knowledge-producing institutions, is its students...in
contrast to the research and development units of firms
and government laboratories that tend to ossify, lacking
the ‘flow-through of human capital’ that is built into
universities,” (Etzkowitz, 2010, p. 1). In the Kenyan case,
I would argue that the current siloing within universities
means that they are not seeing the “flow-through” of
human capital that they need. Instead, even as it is at times
criticized for being disconnected from the local, non-techie
community, the sites of the greatest fluctuation of “human
capital,” individuals who are involved in tech innovation or
who aspire to be, are currently the incubators.

Government

Another site of knowledge production that is often
integrated into models of innovation is the government
R&D lab. It is seen as a starting point from which to launch
companies (Carayannis, Rogers, Kurihara, & Albritton,
1998) or as a key node in Chesbrough’s open innovation
system (Chesbrough, West, & Vanhaverbeke, 2006). In
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the Kenyan case, the government does not operate any of
its own technology R&D labs. As we have seen earlier, the
government does regularly emphasize a rhetorical interest
in the ICT industry, and its newly created ICT Authority has
certainly been working on ways to innovate in its own use of
ICT. The ICT Authority recognized that the government did
not have sufficient internal skills and knowledge to build
new government R&D labs. Instead of channeling money
into creating new government labs they chose to fund an
existing incubator, Nailab, to grow and expand its own
operations. They also offered Nailab additional financial
support to set up satellite incubators in other cities around
the country. However, the ICT Authority lacked familiarity
with the needs of start-ups and the incubators that support
them, which led them to underestimate the amount of
funding needed for Nailab’s expansion. The funding was
thus channeled into trainings and hackathons in different
cities instead of the creation of new physical incubation
offices.
This is emblematic of the Kenyan government’s current
approach to the ICT ecosystem. That is, it does not have the
existing in-house capacity to enable the development of new
technologies but it wants to be a part of the new innovation
process. It directs funding towards others who it thinks
might have the capacity but often misdirects the funding
because it does not yet fully understand the industry. As
one former government official stated, “government is not
an innovative entity” and “it has never quite understood
the tech sector.” The government has also been criticized
for introducing some of its projects too quickly without
thoroughly understanding the industry or the industry’s user
base. For example, the Huduma platform described earlier
crashed soon after it was launched, and the government’s
push to create Konza City to centralize the tech innovation
ecosystem has been criticized for misunderstanding the
existing nature of the ecosystem (The Star, 2012).
Another role that theorists typically ascribe to government
is to “intervene by helping create a new market or
otherwise changing the rules of the game.” (Etzkowitz &
Leydesdorff, 2000). This normally refers to the formation
and implementation of policies that influence innovation
(Chesbrough, West, & Vanhaverbeke, 2006). When Dr.
Ndemo was the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of
Information, the government made noticeable changes in
infrastructure that have helped the industry to develop.
Because of the access to fiber optic cables that were spread
Page 14

throughout much of the country, access to broadband
internet has made working online far more efficient,
enabling a lot of the mobile developments on which the
industry relies. However, one of the current criticisms of the
Kenyan ICT innovation sector is that it has underdeveloped
IP legislation and the legal processes for forming a company
are still quite complicated.
Such criticisms arguably come from a lack of perceived
government engagement with the tech community,
particularly among the young entrepreneurs. While donor
NGOs and multinational companies appear at events held
at the incubators, government attendance has been much
less frequent. The government held its own technology
conference, called Connected Kenya, in 2014, but such
government conferences have ironically been disconnected
from ecosystem conferences that already exist, such as
one of the country’s major competitions for identifying
new entrepreneurial talent, Pivot East. The government
has previously supported projects such as code4kenya and
launched the well-received open data platform, but support
for both of these seems to have stalled.
However, at this point I would draw our attention to
Etzkowitz and Keydesdorff ’s assertion that the balance and
interactivity between the various actors in an innovation
ecosystem are regularly in flux and constantly being
renegotiated and reorganized. As they put it, “The Triple
Helix hypothesis is that systems can be expected to remain
in transition.” (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 113). This
certainly seems to be the case in the current state of this new
industry in Kenya. For example, the government has not
always been criticized for being disengaged. The Ministry
of Information was perceived as much more involved
and responsive than other actors in the ecosystem when
Dr. Ndemo was Permanent Secretary. He attended events
frequently, engaged on an online platform with members
of the community, and responded to industry demands by
pushing for the government to launch the aforementioned
open data platform making tech developments centered
around government data feasible. Similarly, while the
incubators in general were widely praised for bringing
disparate actors involved in mobile innovation in Kenya
together during my first visit in 2013, in 2014 some
interviewees criticized them for becoming disconnected
from the larger community in which they are situated,
focusing disproportionately on appealing to foreign-based
funders.
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The Kenyan government’s role in the ecosystem has both
commonalities and differences with the role of government
as described by existing theories, and this is likely to continue
to fluctuate. The Kenyan government certainly has the
power to influence the ecosystem through policy changes,
but it is currently much less engaged than governments in
other countries, such as Sweden (Bergek & Norman, 2008)
or Rwanda (Aggerwal, 2012), and likely much less engaged
than it wants to be. What is clear is that, unlike many of the
countries where the existing models were developed, the
government in Kenya does not operate its own R&D labs
for developments beyond its own e-government projects
like Huduma. This means that the Kenyan government
is not able to play the knowledge production role that
might be expected of it from the triple helix model. Yet the
government does have the power to “influence the rules of
the game” in how it chooses to form new policies that affect
the sector as well as to what extent it chooses to engage with
other actors in the ecosystem. The next and final section
of this case study looks more in-depth at this question of
engagement, or of networks, both formal and informal,
between the various actors in the ecosystem.

Networks

Of all the areas of existing theory on innovation, the
theories around the role of networks, particularly informal
networks may be the most directly useful for understanding
the Kenyan context. As we saw in the review of theory,
scholars of innovation, such as Nieto, Santamaria, and
Powell, have made a convincing case for the importance of
networks for stimulating greater innovation for companies,
particularly in the case of formal networks like partnerships.
Whether it be partnerships between incubators, donors and
multinationals, between government and multinationals, or
between government and incubators, formal partnerships
have certainly been an important part of the evolution
of the Kenyan ecosystem thus far. In interviews, the
multinational and the government were particularly likely
to talk about such formal partnerships when asked about
engagement in the ecosystem than were the incubators or
the start-ups. One government representative typified the
rhetoric around this position: “We don’t believe we have
all the expertise. So we develop partnerships with others...
Cisco, Huawei, Microsoft, Indian firms, iHub, Nailab,
consultants....” This reflects a theme of scholarship within
the governance literature that champions the importance
of public-private partnerships (Mazouz, Facal, & Viola,
2008). Scholars such as Stewart, for example, have argued

that public-private partnerships are especially useful where
issues the government is tackling are intransigent, which
can be helped by bringing together different individuals
and organizations able to offer different perspectives on the
issue (Stewart, 1996). From the government’s perspective,
the question of how to get the most impact nation-wide out
of the growth of this particular ICT sector certainly falls
into the seemingly “intransigent” category.
Yet even those who talk predominantly about the importance
of formal partnerships acknowledge that they are not
always successful. One representative from a multinational,
for example, explained “it would be arrogant if you said
you’d figured it out. Not all partnerships work. It’s a process;
something we evolve through. Some of the sectors...we’ve
not been very successful with our partnerships.” The
incubators, by contrast, have evolved around much more
informal kinds of networks. They certainly have formal
partnerships; their partnerships with funders and with startups are certainly often formal. But a network of informal
linkages often intersects at incubators connecting many
of the various actors at formal fireside chat type events, at
conferences and competitions, or informally over coffee.
Boschma’s theory about “proximity” is a useful tool for
thinking about these informal linkages and the various
‘proximities’ they afford. As a reminder, in addition to
geographic proximity, Boschma argued that other elements
of proximity are at play, which influence innovation
networks, both formal and informal. One of these is
“cognitive proximity” or the “similarities in the ways
actors perceive, interpret and evaluate the world” (Letaifa
& Rabeau, 2013, p. 2072). In the Kenyan context, the ICT
innovation ecosystem clearly includes many different
kinds of extremely diverse actors with very different ways
of seeing the world. These instances, which lack cognitive
proximity, or what I would call ‘cognitive divergences,’
cut many different ways and overlap to varying degrees
throughout the ecosystem. In the Kenyan case, they
include divergences between multinationals and start-ups,
between multinationals and NGOs, between international
actors and the government, between the government and
the private sector, between the old established actors (like
larger Kenyan telecom companies and the government) and
the young entrepreneurs, and between those who prioritize
economic growth in the industry and those prioritize social
impact.

Page 15

WHO IS ICT INNOVATION FOR? CHALLENGES TO EXISTING THEORIES OF INNOVATION, A KENYAN CASE STUDY

However, innovation theories are actually conflicted on
the impact of cognitive proximity, with some arguing that
excessive cognitive proximity might “reduce the scope
for learning” (Boschma & Frenken, 2010, p. 125). Even
if applied directly, there is a limit to its usefulness for
practitioners interested in making the ecosystem more
“productive.” However, it is still a helpful way to identify the
different kinds of cultural divergences that cut particularly
widely across this ecosystem, such as those between
government and industry and between those interested in
economic growth and those invested in social impact.
Another proximity that might be more relevant in this case is
that of “social proximity.” Social proximity essentially refers
to the informal, interpersonal networks between various
individuals at the different organizations. As Boschma and
Frenken explain, social proximity involves
…trust that is based on friendship, kinship and
experience through repeated interaction. Such
relationships carry information and potential
partners and thereby increase the probability of
organizations to engage in innovation networks.
What is more, the perceived risk of conflict is also
lower as social proximity adds to trust among
organizations. (2010, pp. 122-123)
Other studies have also shown that increasing social
proximity can, at times, help to cross difficult cognitive
divergences (Lundquist & Trippl, 2013)
Numerous actors in the Kenyan ICT ecosystem outside of
iHub have pointed to the moment iHub opened as a bit of a
turning point for Kenyan tech innovation. One interviewee
pointed out that before iHub and the recent tech boom that
it represents, the private sector and civil society really did
not work together. I would argue that the ability of preincubators like iHub to bring people together, to increase
the geographic proximity of individual actors as we saw
earlier, can be a key component that can help increase social
proximity among many different actors from very different
cognitive positions.
However, my interviews also revealed a general feeling
that key individuals could be central in helping disparate
groups cross cognitive divergences and communicate more
effectively. In the majority of the interviews I conducted,
Dr. Bitange Ndemo was cited as one such key individual.
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Dr. Ndemo was not only the former Permanent Secretary
to the Ministry of Information. He has also been on the
board of iHub, has convinced multinationals to engage
more in the Kenyan ecosystem, gives monthly talks to tech
entrepreneurs, and has been working with universities
to try to encourage inter-departmental collaboration for
innovation. Interviewees described him as “an important
spokesperson and mouthpiece in terms of transforming
culture in government,” “very visionary; pretty much
the reason we are all here,” and “really able to excite the
environment for technology around the same time as the
incubators.” Around the same time that the incubators
were transforming the networks between industry and civil
society, Dr. Ndemo was a government official who “actually
listened” to other actors and who helped ensure government
policy was supportive of these changes.
Many scholars of Africa have similarly pointed out the
important role that these kinds of social networks – and
key individual nodes in those networks like Dr. Ndemo
– have played in the development of other African
economies (Gregore and Labazee 1993; Hansen and Vaa
2004, Hyden 1990, MacGaffey and Windperger 1990).
However, the impact of informal social networks is not
always so clearly beneficial. Meagher and others have
shown how informal social networks can at times “operate
as mechanisms of parochialism or collusion that disrupt
economic development.” (Meagher, 2005, p. 221). While
the theories about networks from innovation scholars
may indeed be useful for understanding the interactional
nature of the Kenyan ICT innovation ecosystem, they are
not prescriptive. Applying them to the complex ecosystem,
with various overlapping power relationships and networks,
in the urban transnationalism that is the Kenyan context
should be done with caution. As the famous sociologist
Andrew Sayer notably argued:
Networks do not necessarily fuse the self-interest of
different actors into a harmonious and egalitarian
whole; they may be characterized by inequalities
of power, strategic coalitions, dissembling and
opportunistic collaboration. …Even where groups
are associated with kinship networks, as many
are, these are likely to be characterized by power
asymmetries as well as a sense of moral obligation.
What appears to indicate trust may be largely a
consequence of domination or lack of alternatives,
or simple mutual dependency. (Sayer, 2001, p. 699)
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Conclusion
The pioneering French economic geographer Aydalot once
hypothesized that “local environments play a determinant
role as innovation incubators.” He believed that “a firm is
not an isolated innovator; it is part of an area which makes
it act and react. The history of an area, its organization, its
collective behavior and its internal structure of unanimity
are the principal components of innovation” (Aydalot,
1986). I would argue that the particularities of the local
environments where ICT developments are increasingly
taking place around Africa have been insufficiently
integrated into our theories of technology innovation.
This is true of the business and management theorists who
have typically been some of the stewards of technology
innovation scholarship, but who have disproportionately
focused on the role of the company in this process. It is also
true of scholars in the ICT and development field, who have
advanced a substantial body of literature around the impact
of new ICTs, or around the adoption and diffusion of
these technologies, but who have thus far under-theorized
the process of technology innovation “in situ” within
developing countries (Avgerou, 2010).
While the theories developed to better understand
innovation processes in countries such as the United States
can be a useful place to start when looking at Kenya, they
are just that, a place to start. On a continent with such a
long history of international involvement, either through
governments, development projects, or multinationals to
name but a few examples, it is impossible to understand the
current state of technology innovation in Kenya without
incorporating into our theories both the impact of foreign
actors with economic capital as well as the inclusion of
innovations with a social impact objective in addition to an
economic one. The anthropologist, Jane Guyer, theorized
in her seminal text, Marginal Gains, that the economic
history of the African continent is a “co-production of
Africa and Europe over centuries of economic and political
engagement” (Guyer, 2004). The nature of the relationship
between African, European, and American actors involved
on the continent has certainly changed over time. It would
be counterproductive, however, to ignore many of the
underlying social and economic power dynamics that are
historically embedded in a context as transnational as the
ICT innovation ecosystem in Kenya. A greater body of

theory is needed to understand the particular nature of
technology innovation in these transnational post-colonial
contexts. It is my hope that the analysis provided in this
article can serve as a stepping-stone to developments in this
direction.
I have shown that despite their limitations, some of
the existing innovation theories can in fact be helpful.
Etzkowitz’s triple helix model of the fluctuating
relationships between government, universities, and
industry, as well as the theories around informal networks
and innovations, particularly those of cognitive and
social proximity, can inform our understanding of the
structure of the Kenyan ICT innovation ecosystem. Yet
the nature of the current roles played by the government
and by the universities in Kenya notably differ from those
conceptualized in the triple helix, with incubators possessing
some of the characteristics Etzkowitz would likely ascribe
to universities, like the ‘flow-though’ of human capital
advantageous to knowledge production. Even if the existing
theories on innovation may be helpful in some regard, they
should always be approached with a critical eye.
The aspect of the Kenyan ICT innovation ecosystem that
is particularly challenging to existing theories lies in its
purpose. In many technology industries the end goal of
market-based profits or economic growth is expected to
dominate. In Kenya, with such a long history of international
NGO engagement, economic growth necessarily has
to compete with “social impact” for dominance of the
industry. This challenges many of the underlying neoliberal
assumption of many existing theories of innovation. That is
not to say that it is such a dichotomous either/or exchange.
Instead, these regularly overlapping goals, which are able
to even influence the objectives of multinationals, are
constantly renegotiated and rebalanced. Yet this unusual
need for regular renegotiation has an advantage. It can allow
space to regularly question the objectives of the ecosystem
– objectives that too frequently lay unchallenged. Is the
purpose of developing an ICT industry in Kenya to enable
the development of new technologies – new software
programs, new hardware, new applications – that better
reflect the local culture and better reflect the needs of the
local community as articulated by them? Or is the purpose
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to provide a space for Kenyan entrepreneurs to develop
their own products that can be globally distributed and
accelerate the growth of this middle-income country? Can
the purpose be some combination of the two? Can it be
something else entirely? In reality, the ‘purpose’ is not some
unified thing that is defined by the ecosystem as a whole.
Rather it is regularly constructed individually by all of the
many different actors involved in the space.
Once we have examined critically the nature of the actors
and relationships around innovation as I have begun to do
in this paper, those engaged in the ecosystem may be better
placed to figure out how to achieve particular goals, to make
innovation and the ICT sector more economically efficient,
or more socially impactful for example. It is my hope that
this illustration might be a helpful word of caution for
practitioners, policymakers, innovators as well as theorists
eager to fully adopt existing technology innovation theories
in such a transnational ecosystem without critiquing the
socio-economic impact of doing so.
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